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Abstract 
 
 
What economic mechanisms underlie the polarisation of the world economy into the ‘high 
wage’ industrialised countries, and the less developed ‘low wage’ countries?  Should we 
expect the two groups to converge over time, or to diverge?  What economic mechanisms 
come into play as LDCs attempt to ‘catch up’?  How does the current liberalisation of world 
trade, or ‘globalisation’, impinge on these countries, and how does it affect the prospects for 
‘convergence’? 
 
In this paper I bring together two recent economic literatures which have developed 
independently of each other over the past decade.  The first is the ‘Geography and Trade’ 
literature, which has cast new light on how the dichotomy between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries 
evolves.  The second literature is the modern ‘market structure’ literature, which examines 
how global industries may of necessity be dominated by a relatively small number of leading 
producers.   
 
At the heart of this discussion is what I shall label ‘scarce capabilities’: just as the Golden 
Age of the Dutch republic was founded on the establishment of its dominance of the ‘rich 
trades’ (the maritime sea-routes to the Indies and the Caribbean), so the wealth of modern 
industrialised economies rests on the network of firms that enjoy ‘scarce capabilities’, the 
rent from which manifests itself primarily in the form of high real wages in their domestic 
labour markets.  How this comes about, and how it persists, is my central theme. 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decade of the sixteenth century, the Dutch republic underwent a dramatic 
economic transformation that laid the foundation of the countrys Golden Age.  At the heart 
of this process was the rise of the rich trades, the network by which Dutch shipping came to 
dominate the lucrative trade routes to the East Indies, the Americas and the Levant (Israel 
(1990)).  The rise of the rich trades provides me with an archetypal example of the 
economic process which I want to explore in what follows.  Many of the themes which I 
develop below emerge clearly in the Dutch story: the steady displacement of an old and well 
established bulk-carrying trade in which the Dutch had so long excelled by this hugely more 
lucrative new activity; heavy fixed outlays in building up a network of supporting facilities; 
the growth and development of a series of domestic industries that could benefit from the 
export opportunities opened up by this new shipping activity; and, most importantly - a huge 
rise in real wages in the Dutch Republic, relative to levels in neighbouring countries.   
 
It is this last feature of the process, the rise in real wages, which forms my point of departure.  
It would seem that some kinds of economic activity are more lucrative than others; and 
countries specialising in such activities will enjoy a higher level of real wages than their 
neighbours.  From the viewpoint of classical economic analysis, this line of argument invites 
a number of immediate objections.  If some activities are more lucrative than others, will not 
new entrepreneurs, firms or countries flock to these activities, driving their net returns back to 
some normal level?  If free movement of labour across countries is possible, then labour 
flows will offset the wage differential; while if labour is not free to move, firms will shift 
their 'lucrative activities' to low wage regions, thus again offsetting the wage differential.  At 
the heart of my story lie two ideas: the first concerns scarcity, the second immobility. 
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The notion that some activity remains lucrative demands a story about scarcity:  I will locate 
this scarcity in the capabilities of firms (Nelson and Winter (1982)), where capability can be 
thought of as comprising two elements: a measure of the maximum quality level that the firm 
can achieve, and a measure of its cost of production (productivity), for each product line.  It is 
a firms relative capability vis-a-vis its rivals that will turn out to matter in what follows.  In 
fact, there is a window within which a firms capability must lie, if it is to earn any sales 
revenue at all.  Competition between firms to enhance their relative capabilities, moreover, 
will involve, inter alia, an escalation of their spending on R&D and other fixed outlays, and 
the effect of this will be to shake out all but some limited number of active firms in any 
market (independently of the size of the global economy).  It is in this sense that capabilities 
become scarce. 
 
Now if a single firm can improve its capability relative to all its rivals, it will enjoy a rent of 
ability in the form of enhanced profits.  If, however, several firms attain a similarly high 
level of capability, this rent is dissipated in part via price competition, to the benefit of 
consumers.  Now suppose this group of highly capable firms are clustered in some 
geographic area, and suppose labour is imperfectly mobile across areas.  Then the effect of 
this enhancement in the firms capabilities, relative to those of firms outside this region, is to 
push up the demand for labour in the region.  I will argue that the primary beneficiaries of 
local firms enhanced capabilities are not the firms themselves, but the local workforce on 
which they rely;  their superior capabilities translate into high real wages.   
 
To complete the story, I need to explain why the resulting real wage differentials can persist:  
why do high capability firms not move to low wage regions?  Here, we come to the crux 
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of the matter:  I argue that the capability in question is embodied in the set of workers that 
comprise the firm;  and imperfect mobility of even some individual workers may imply that 
any re-location of the firms activities may involve costs sufficient to outweigh any putative 
gains from lower wages. 
 
But why should the group of high capability firms be clustered in the same geographic 
area?  Why can they not be scattered uniformly across all regions?  Here, I appeal to the 
mechanism that lies at the heart of the recent Geography and Trade literature (Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables (1999)), which turns on the input-output linkages across 
manufacturing firms.  Two-thirds of manufacturing output consists of intermediate goods, 
sold by one firm to another. The presence of a rich network of manufacturing firms provides 
a positive externality for each firm in the system, allowing it to acquire inputs locally, thus 
reducing the costs of transport, of coordination, of monitoring and of contracting.  Once this 
effect is allowed for, the location decisions of firms become interdependent; a divided 
world may emerge, in which a network of manufacturing firms is clustered in some 'high 
wage' region, while wages in the remaining regions stay low.  
 
Now the Geography and Trade literature provides a highly plausible account of how the 
division into two groups occurs.  But what does it imply for the process of catching up?  
What it places at the centre of the analysis is the interdependence of a network of domestic 
firms; so that the main barrier to development lies in the diseconomies faced by any single 
firm in relocating itself (The all-at-once problem).  Now this is, I will argue, only one half 
of the problem.  To understand the other half of the problem, I will argue, we need to look 
once again at the nature of capabilities.   
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In the second half of this paper I will illustrate some of the ideas involved by looking at the 
Indian machine tool industry.  In this case, the industry is well supported by a well-developed 
mechanical engineering industry, and the focus of its difficulties following the recent 
liberalization of India's trade regime lie, not in the all-at-once problem, but rather in the 
challenge of keeping in step with the international quality window.  It is in the integration 
of ideas about quality competition, which come from the recent market structure literature 
(Sutton (1998)), with the ideas regarding clustering which emerge from the new Geography 
and Trade literature that the novelty of the present analysis lies. 
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1.  Capability, Quality and Wages 
 
The first step in the argument is best illustrated by sketching out a simple example involving 
two countries, each endowed with the same labour supply function.  Labour is immobile 
across countries, but goods are traded freely in a single global market. 
 
Suppose there are three industries.  Each industry comprises a number of firms producing 
distinct substitute goods of varying levels of quality.  All consumers have the same tastes; 
consumers devote one third of their incomes to the products of each industry1.  Higher quality 
products command a higher price at equilibrium: relative prices are such that consumers are 
indifferent between any two products which command positive sales at equilibrium, given the 
qualities and prices of these products.  Each product is produced using c units of labour per 
unit of good produced, and so at constant marginal cost cw, where w is the wage rate. 
 
Now suppose all the firms in industry 1 of country A produce goods of the same quality uA, 
while their counterparts in Country B all produce at quality level uB.  Similarly, in industry 2, 
the country A firms produce at quality level vA and those in Country B at quality level vB.  In 
industry 3, all firms in both countries produce at the same fixed quality level. 
 
Now if uA = uB and vA = vB, the setup is symmetric and the equilibrium real wage is the same 
in both countries.  What I want to examine is the effect of a rise in capability among firms in 
country A.  Keeping uB and vB fixed, let uA and vA increase.  The initial effect of this increase 
will be to raise the relative volume of production of these two industries in country A, and to 
                                                 
1 The details of this kind of model are developed in Sutton (1991,1998).  In particular, Chapter 3 of Sutton 
(1991) provides a simple example in which consumers are equipped with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, and 
so divide their income in some fixed proportions between the various goods, independently of their relative 
prices. 
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lower it in country B.  Meanwhile, more production of the third industry shifts to country B; 
real wages remain the same in both countries. 
 
As uA and vA rise further, however, all production of these industries shifts to country A.  A 
key property all models of this kind is that if the ratio uA/uB is sufficiently high, then (so long 
as two or more firms offer quality uA) at equilibrium prices all consumers will choose the 
high quality good.  The equilibrium price of this good will be so low that, even if producers 
of the low quality rival good offered it at a price equal to its marginal cost of production, 
consumers would still prefer to buy the higher quality good.  In other words, given uA, there 
is some threshold quality u below which country B will earn no sales revenue from this good.  
 
As uA and vA rise, then, we will eventually reach a point where only country A produces 
these goods;  uB lies below the quality window [uA, u].  Moreover, all production of the third 
good shifts to country B.  Now factor price equalization breaks down: the demand for 
labour, and so the real wage, in country A exceed that of country B (Figure 1)2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Quality and wages in the two-country model, where uA >> uB, vA >> vB. 
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This notion of a quality window generalises easily to a setting in which each firm is 
described by a  capability expressed as a pair of numbers (u,c), representing the (maximum) 
quality level it is able to offer, and its productivity, i.e. the number of units of labour input 
required per unit of good produced3 (Figure 2). A further generalisation lies in introducing 
several different markets (or submarkets), so that the firms capability' is now expressed as a 
vector, specifying a (u,c) pair for each 'technological trajectory' along which it develops 
expertise, and so for the market (or submarket) in which it sells goods embodying that 
capability4.   
 
The notion of the window carries over directly to this more complex setting (Figure 4): 
firms whose (quality, productivity) combination falls below a threshold in (c;u) space will not 
achieve any sales in the associated market5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 As this number rises, we may approach a zero profit equilibrium, in which the number of firms is such that 
gross profit exactly covers the fixed outlays (R&D etc.) incurred by each entrant in achieving its quality level u1. 
3 For the equivalence between the quality (product innovation) model and the productivity (process 
innovation) model, see Sutton (1998), Appendices 14.1, 15.1. 
4 For details regarding this more complex setting, and a definition of technical trajectories and their associated 
submarkets, see Sutton (1998), Chapter 3. 
5 Readers interested in the technical details may wish to consult Sutton 1998, Appendices 14.1 and 15.1, where 
an example is developed within which a firm's capability can be expressed simply as a ratio u/c; I have used this 
example in drawing Figure 3. 
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Figure 2.   A firm is represented by its capability (u,c) along each technological 
trajectory.  The parameter c measures its productivity, its unit cost of 
production being cw, where w is the local wage rate.  The parameter u 
measures quality.  A rise in u shifts demand outwards, given any level of 
prices and qualities offered by the firms rivals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The window of capability (a,b).  The firms denoted by x are viable; the firm 
denoted by      is not.  The curves on the diagram represent lines of constant 
capability along which u/c is a constant.  The constant b corresponds to the 
threshold level of capability, while the constant a corresponds to the highest 
level of capability. 
cw 
u 
x
x
u 
(Quality)
1/c (Productivity) 
u/c = b
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×
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Scarce capabilities:  the escalation mechanism 
 
So what is capability?  What determines the levels of attainable quality, and productivity?  
The list of proximate causes range from inventiveness in finding new methods of production, 
to the mixture of luck and judgement involved in successful product development.  But all 
that matters, from my present point of view, is that among the factors in this list, there should 
appear one which plays a crucial role:  if among the various ways of improving capability is 
the use of enhanced fixed outlays by the firm - in the form, say, of R&D spending devoted 
either to product innovation (i.e. raising u) or process innovation (i.e. lowering c) - then 
certain fundamental results will follow6. 
 
The central idea is that in this kind of setting, there will be a lower bound to market 
concentration7; the number of firms that survive in the window will be limited - and this 
limit or bound on the number of active firms will remain constant, irrespective of how large 
the global market becomes.  As the global market grows, the effect is not to draw in an ever-
increasing number of active firms;  rather, it is to enhance the efforts made, and the fixed 
outlays spent, by a relatively small  number of active firms, whose efforts raise their 
capabilities, and so raise the window within which any viable firm must operate.  This 
carries some serious implications for the analysis of the effects of globalization, as we will 
see in what follows. 
 
                                                 
6 Readers familiar with the capabilities literature will notice that I am defining capabilities here in a static way 
(current capability). An important extension lies in introducing the idea that firms may differ in their ability to 
improve  their levels of c and u over time (dynamic capability; see for example Bell and Pavitt).  This can be 
incorporated into the present setup by allowing the form of the fixed cost schedule, linking c and u to R&D 
spending, to vary across firms;  an exploration of this theme lies beyond my present scope. 
7 The term market concentration relates to the degree to which the market is dominated by a few large firms;  it 
is conventionally measured as the combined market share of the largest 4 (or so) firms in the market. 
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So what determines the number of active firms, or the level of market concentration?  The 
answer turns on the following question:  suppose that some firm was to enter the market, 
whose capability exceeded that of all currently active firms by some factor, which we may 
label as k.  How great would be the gross profit8 earned by such a firm in the new post-entry 
equilibrium, expressed as a proportion of the industry's current (i.e. pre-entry) sales revenue?  
Label this ratio a(k) 9.  To complete the picture, we ask:  how effective are fixed outlays (such 
as R&D, say) in raising capability?  Specifically, denote by β the elasticity of response of u 
(or of 1/c), to increases in fixed outlays10.  The bound to concentration in the market is a 
simple function of these three numbers;  it is increasing in a, and decreasing in k and in β11. 
 
To show what is implied by all this, it is useful to move to a concrete and realistic setting in 
which firms face a number of alternative routes along which they might proceed in 
developing their capabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 i.e. profit prior to the deduction of fixed outlays incurred. 
9 To be more precise: the answer to this question will depend upon the way in which existing firm's capabilities 
are distributed, relative to the existing top level of capability; so in defining a(k), we need to choose a worst 
case, in order to be able to guarantee that our new entrant will earn a profit at least equal to a(k) times current 
industry revenue.  In choosing k, (the size of jump) on the other hand, this is a parameter under the entrant's 
control, and so we can choose the value that yields the highest resulting profit.  Readers interested in a precise 
statement of this basic nonconvergence result may wish to consult Sutton (1998), Chapter 3.  The basic idea 
can be traced in the literature to Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1987). 
10 i.e. a 1% increase in u (or in 1/c) requires a β% increase in fixed outlays. 
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Figure 4. A figurative illustration of the way in which the pattern of industry evolution 
is driven both by the effectiveness of fixed outlays in raising capability 
(measured by 1/β), and by the gross profits generated by raising u along any 
single trajectory, expressed as a fraction of industry sales revenue (measured 
by a(k)).  Concentration is low at both A and B, in the figure, and high at C.  
Spending on fixed outlays (as measured, say, by the ratio of R&D outlays to 
industry sales) is low at A, but high at B and C. 
 
A figurative illustration of the way in which the three parameters impinge on market structure 
is sketched in Figure 4.  The story goes as follows:  if the effectiveness of fixed outlays, as 
measured by 1/β, is low, then the fraction of industry revenue devoted to such spending will 
be low.  This situation corresponds to those low-tech industries where methods of 
production, and product design, are standardised (Point A in Figure 4). This is the setting 
captured by the monopolistic competition models used in the current Geography and Trade 
literature.  Where, by contrast, the effectiveness of such outlays is high, we will see firms 
vying to enhance their relative capabilities.  The resulting outcome depends on a(k) and it is 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Formally, at equilibrium at least one firm in the market must have a share of industry sales revenue that 
1/β 
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useful to look at two polar cases.  There will, in general, be various directions in which 
capabilities can be advanced (i.e. "alternative technical trajectories" along which R&D 
outlays can be spent), and associated with each of these will be a different set of products that 
can be offered (Figure 5).  One polar case arises when, for a given size of jump k, the 
returns (as measured by a(k)) are small relative to industry sales revenue:  here, the different 
trajectories lead to alternative types of product each of which commands a certain share of 
total demand, even if it lags in quality behind the others.  The flowmeter industry is an 
archetypal example of this scenario:  flowmeters come in various types, each associated with 
a different form of technology (electromagnetic, ultrasonic, etc.).  Different groups of users 
will strongly prefer one of these to another, depending on the nature of the application (oil 
pipelines; general chemical plant; etc.).  The evolution of this (kind of) industry is 
characterised by a proliferation of new product types as new technological trajectories are 
explored.  The result is that the global market can support a large number of players, and 
relatively small firms can achieve viability by specializing in a single product type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. How industries evolve: two polar cases. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
exceeds a(k)/kβ (Sutton (1998) Chapter 3).  A lower bound to concentration is obtained by taking the value of k 
which makes this ratio as high as possible. 
(a) the ‘Flowmeters’ case (b) the ‘Aircraft’ case 
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The other polar case is illustrated by the early history of the aircraft industry.  In the early 
1930s, various technical trajectories were followed, and alternative designs proliferated 
(monoplane, biplanes, and triplanes; planes of metal and non-metal construction; land planes 
and seaplanes).  The objective function of the various airlines was, however, identical:  they 
wanted a plane that could achieve a high level of operating efficiency, as measured by the 
cost per passenger mile.  By 1936, the launch of the Douglas DC-3 established the 
superiority of one particular trajectory;  from this point forward almost all efforts would be 
focused on the launch and improvement of single wing all-metal monoplanes, with a 
particular (cantilevered) form of wing design. 
 
In terms of the theory, this polar case corresponds to a situation where, for a given k, the 
value of a is high.  If higher quality (here, lower costs-per-passenger mile) can be attained 
along any one trajectory, buyers will readily switch their allegiance from other forms of 
product:  all that matters is a single criterion.  Industries of this kind will necessarily move 
towards a highly concentrated market structure, in which a small number of players dominate 
the global market. 
 
So what does a(k) measure?  In terms of the present example, it can be seen as a measure of 
the degree to which the products associated with different technical trajectories are good 
substitutes: the degree of substitutability of these goods in buyers eyes is one determinant of 
the value of a(k).  More generally, what matters is the strength of the linkages between these 
trajectories, both on the demand size (product substitutability in the eyes of buyers), and on 
the supply side (the presence of scope economies in capability building, which allow 
advances in capability on one trajectory to automatically enhance capability on another 
trajectory, or to reduce the cost of enhancing that capability). 
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So what does this imply for the evolution of market structure?  Where the effectiveness of 
fixed outlays is low (point A in Figure 4), we can have a fragmented industry structure, with 
many small firms;  here, the levels of capability of all firms can converge to a similar level.  
As we move up the diagram, however, firms fixed outlays, and so their capabilities, rise: and 
to achieve viability, a firm must be in the relevant window.  What distinguishes outcomes B 
and C in the diagram is the mechanism just noted, according to which we may move to a 
fragmented structure (proliferation; point B) or to a concentrated one (escalation; point C).  In 
both cases, however, achieving viability within any product category requires a capability 
that lies within the relevant window.  Once fixed outlays constitute one of the available 
routes to improving capability, the number of viable players in the global market will be 
bounded. 
 
In this section, I have drawn on the recent Industrial Organization literature to show how 
competition in capability building will shake out all but a limited number of competitors in 
the production of final goods in any (narrowly defined) product group.  This begs the 
question: if there are many trajectories and related product groups, why can we not have a 
homogenous world economy in which these viable firms are scattered evenly across all 
geographical regions?  It is at this point that I turn to the recent Geography and Trade 
literature, whose main focus over the past decade has lain in tackling this question. 
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2.  Clustering 
 
The answer proposed by Krugman and Venables turns on the notion of supply-side linkages 
between firms.  Specifically, it depends on the degree to which a firm can reduce its costs 
through buying and selling intermediate goods (materials, components and sub-assemblies) 
from local firms, as opposed to firms operating in other regions.  Translating the Krugman-
Venables argument into the present context, what it supposes is that our high quality firms 
enjoy a positive externality from the presence of other high quality firms within the same 
region. 
 
Using the Krugman-Venables diagram, we depict in Figure 6 one kind of pattern that may 
develop.  If the links are weak, a 2-country world will have an equilibrium in which our high 
capability firms are uniformly spread across the two countries.  Once the linkages become 
stronger, however, a split develops, with one or other country emerging as the high-wage 
country. This externality provides one reason why, once the pattern has emerged, no one 
high capability firm will find it profitable to migrate to the lower wage region.  Only if a 
whole cluster of interdependent firms migrate together, will the wage-cost gains outweigh the 
cost increase caused by the loss of the relevant linkages. 
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Figure 6.  Clustering (Krugman-Venables).  The case illustrated here is one in which, when 
the strength of linkages takes an intermediate value, there are two types of 
equilibria (homogenous world/divided world). 
 
My focus here lies, not in re-stating the arguments of Krugman and Venables to explain how 
we get to a bipolar world12, but rather in asking: once we are in a bipolar world, is it stable? 
More particularly, what barriers lie in the way of firms in the disadvantaged region, when 
they attempt to catch up? 
 
 
                                                 
12 For these arguments, see Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). 
Strength of linkages 
Real 
Wages 
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3. High Quality Firms, Low Wage Workers?  A Question of (Im)mobility 
 
Why does any individual high-quality producer not move to the low-wage country?  The 
answer given in the Geography and Trade literature rests on the notion of interdependencies 
among firms: each firm relies on suppliers of intermediate inputs.  A wholesale move of all 
firms would simply raise wages in the country of destination;  a move by a single firm would 
deprive it of sources of (accessible, local) supply, which would result in its incurring 
transport costs (and perhaps other coordination or contractual costs) with distant suppliers.   
 
Here, I want to suggest an additional mechanism.  This mechanism rests on the notion that a 
firms capability is embodied, not only its property rights (by way of patents, etc.) but, more 
importantly, on the tacit knowledge possessed jointly by those individuals who comprise 
the firms workforce. 
 
To illustrate what I have in mind here, let me invoke a simple schema, illustrated in Figure 7.  
Imagine a set of discrete tasks that may need to be accomplished in the course of developing 
the next generation of products produced by the firm, along some given R&D trajectory.  So 
long as one employee knows how to do task i, this knowledge can be passed to others at 
negligible cost.  On the other hand, if we remove all those individuals who can do task i, then 
the firm incurs a cost (of delay, or otherwise) as the lost knowledge has to be (re-)learned or 
(re-)invented. 
 
Now imagine a firm in which a large number of employees each carry out a small number of 
standardised tasks (Panel a).  Here, a small fractional reduction in the workforce deletes no 
knowledge.  By contrast, take a firm where certain tasks/elements of expertise are the 
 18
preserve of a small number of workers;  now the loss of a small fraction of workers can result 
in a substantial loss of know-how (Panel b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.   The spread of expertise: two extreme cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The loss of know-how, expressed as a fraction of tasks, which follows when 
every second worker quits (Panels (a) and (b) correspond to panels (a) and (b) 
of Figure 7, respectively. 
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What is striking about mobility patterns of multinational firms is that they show a high 
propensity to shift to low wage countries those kinds of activity illustrated in panel (a) of 
Figures 7,8;  but to retain in their domestic market those activities which demand the core 
competencies embodied in scarce know how, illustrated in panel (b) of the figures.  In this 
latter case, while a slow rate of turnover of labour involves no substantial cost (in any one 
period, the loss of a single worker involves no loss of collective know-how; next periods 
incoming workers can be trained at minimal cost), moving the firm to a new country will 
involve the loss of a significant fraction of immobile individuals who will quit rather than 
move13, and so will imply a costly loss of collective know-how.  So what I want to argue 
here, is that once the capabilities are embodied, via domestic firms, in domestic 
employees, the firm is no longer (perfectly) mobile in the face of real wage differentials.  The 
divided world scenario becomes an equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
13 The introduction of compensating payments to such individuals leaves my argument unchanged. 
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4.  Globalization Pains 
 
It is time to turn from the description of the model, to some of its implications. Within the 
framework I have sketched above, the impact of trade liberalization derives from two basic 
mechanisms: 
- an intensification of price competition which squeezes price-cost margins for all 
firms; 
- a consequent narrowing of the capability window in which firms operate, as the 
minimum level consistent with viability rises. 
 
Firms optimal responses to these pressures involve an increase in resources devoted to 
raising capability, leading to a further upward shift in the window.  Firms beginning with a 
lower level of capability now face a dilemma:  depending on how low their current capability 
is, it may or may not be worth investing the necessary effort in re-establishing viability; for 
weaker competitors, the optimal strategy may be to quit the race. 
 
The nature of these problems is well illustrated by the case of the Indian machine-tool 
industry, to which I turn in the next section. 
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5.  An Illustration: the Indian Machine-tool industry 
 
To illustrate these ideas, and to develop some of their implications, I would like to focus on 
an industry which lies in the middle of the triangle diagram of Figure 4 above: the machine 
tool industry.  While reported R&D levels for this industry are moderate, the fraction of a 
leading firms manpower involved in machine design (fixed outlays) is of the order of 10 or 
15 percent, so that the industry lies in the middle ground between commodity-type 
industries (point A of Figure 4) and high tech industries (points B and C of Figure 4).  
Moreover, the industrys products fall into a modest number of basic non-substitutable 
machine types that have few design commonalities (lathes or turning centres, vertical and 
horizontal milling machines or machining centres, gear-cutting machines and so on), 
leaving it midway between the polar cases shown by points B and C in Figure 4.    
 
The Indian industry is a long-established one.  From the 1950s to the early 1990s, it operated 
in a protected environment, with tariffs on imported machines running as high as 100%.  The 
industry was, and still is, dominated by some 8-10 leading firms; some 30 firms now account 
for 70% of industry sales revenue.  Up to the early 1990s, these firms exported a substantial 
share of their output to the (price-sensitive, quality-insenstive) markets of Eastern Europe and 
the USSR.  The changing economic environment of the 1990s led to a collapse in this export 
activity.  The liberalization of trade, from 1992 onwards, has led to a fall in import duties to 
around 15%, and the industry is now adapting rapidly, and rather painfully, to this new 
regime. 
 
The Technology 
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The technology of machine-tools underwent a major change in the 1960s and 70s with the 
introduction of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines.  The advent of these 
machines had some interesting consequences: while such machines offered higher 
productivity and enhanced precision, their production did not - paradoxically - require greater 
competence in the construction of the machine itself.  What was now crucial to the 
performance of the machine was two elements: the computer controls (CNC units) 
themselves, and the ball screw (and ball bearings) that serve to move the tool into position 
for cutting.  A ball-screw is a long threaded cylinder, about 1cm in diameter and over a meter 
long.  The level of accuracy demanded for the threads in ball screws used in CNC machines 
is at the limits of what can be currently achieved: accuracy is measured by looking at the 
cumulative error in thread length over a distance of a meter, and is calculated in microns. 
 
What the advent of CNC machines did, in terms of market structure, was to split the 
production of the machine among three groups of firms: the CNC controls are made by 
specialist producers, two of whom dominate the global market (Fanuc of Japan and Seimens 
of Germany).  Several machine tool companies make CNC controls in-house, but these 
controls do not compete on equal terms with those of Fanuc and Siemens in sales to other 
machine-tool makers.   Ball screws come in various quality bands;  new CNC machine tools 
sold in major industrialized countries come equipped with Class 1 ballscrews, and there are 
only about five firms worldwide supplying these.  The number of machine-tool makers who 
manufacture Class 1 ballscrews in-house is no more than a handful  worldwide.  
 
Almost all leading machine-tool firms buy in both their CNC controls, and their ball-screws 
(and ball bearings) from specialist producers.  The cost of these critical elements will 
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typically constitute about 50% or so of the total production cost of a CNC machine; this 
figure holds good both for Indian producers, and their leading international rivals. 
 
The Changing Environment 
 
From 1992 onwards, as India moved to a more open trading regime, competitive pressures on 
Indian industry became more intense.  Some industries thrived: events in the car industry 
were dominated by the rise of the Suzuki-Maruti joint venture that has by now captured 70% 
of the market.  The related growth of the auto-components sector has been no less 
noteworthy, and the productivity and quality levels achieved in some of the leading 
component producers are close to those achieved in the US, Japan and Europe. 
 
For the machine tool industry, however the years since 1992 have been difficult.  As tariff 
barriers fell, a surge in the volume of imported machines led to a large loss of market share 
for India's leading producers.  In the mid-90s, the most important pressure came from 
Taiwanese producers of CNC lathes who undercut the prices of Indias main producers by 
20% or so.  Given the huge disparity in wage costs (a ratio of 6:1), this might seem surprising 
- or at least indicative of a huge difference in productivity levels.   
 
So how large is the productivity gap?  Over the past year, I have been engaged in a World 
Bank sponsored benchmarking study of Indian firms relative to their counterparts in Taiwan 
and Japan.  The most striking finding to emerge relates to the huge difference in gross labour 
productivity14 among Indian producers: the levels range over a factor of 4 or more, with the 
                                                 
14 Measured as the annual production of CNC lathes of a specific type, divided by total employment in the lathe 
business, excluding design staff and sales/service staff. 
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highest recorded level coming close to the levels achieved by some Taiwanese firms15.  
Overall, while productivity differences are substantial, they are not so large - given relative 
wage levels - to constitute a critical problem for Indian firms.  Indeed, the success of 
Taiwanese producers in India during the mid-90s was short-lived: the late 90s were marked 
by a decline in Taiwanese imports, and a partial recovery of Indian firms.  Interestingly, this 
recovery was led by the youngest of the Indian producers, Ace Designers.  Founded in 1990 
by four machine tool design engineers, the firm focuses on a narrow product line (small and 
medium size CNC lathes16), and employs an unusually high proportion of designers (20%) 
among its workforce.  In the late 90s, Ace embarked on a new pricing policy, cutting its 
prices by 10%, and doubling its sales volume.  Currently, the firm accounts for 70% of Indian 
sales of CNC lathes, in spite of its being one of the smallest of the eight major suppliers in 
terms of total employment. 
 
These shifts in fortune among machine tool producers are typical of the patterns of events 
that follow trade liberalization: as price competition becomes more intense, the relative 
output levels of more efficient, versus less efficient, producers begin to shift.  The long term 
consequences of the new pricing environment tend to involve a mixture of consolidation and 
exit, and a rise in the level of concentration in the industry.   
 
Beyond productivity 
 
The most important challenge now facing the Indian industry lies in competing, not with low-
price imports, but with imported machines of higher quality.  As part of the World Bank 
benchmarking study, we identified 50 Indian firms that used an Indian CNC lathe or vertical 
                                                 
15 The sources of these differences include, of course, differences in capital intensity (of which more below).  
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machining centre, side by side in the same plant, carrying out the same operations, as an 
imported machine of the same type.  These users were asked to identify, at a rather detailed 
level, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two machines.  The key advantages of the 
imported machine lay in their higher levels of accuracy and reliability17. The mean 
differences were modest18, and given the price differentials involved (which typically run to 
50% or more), it is clear that the price premium customers are willing to pay for modest 
improvements in accuracy and reliability are substantial.  Put another way, the returns to 
firms from modest quality improvement may far outrun any gains which they stand to make 
by improving their levels of labour productivity.  Indeed, since CNC controls and ball screws 
account for about half of unit costs, and raw materials, energy costs, and bought-in 
components such as castings and sheet metal parts, together with overhead costs, make up 
another 30% of unit cost, only some 20% of unit cost is attributed to (direct) labour costs for 
the typical producers.  A doubling of labour productivity will, under these circumstances, 
reduce unit costs by a mere 10%.  Meanwhile, fairly modest improvements in accuracy and 
reliability may support a substantially higher price difference. 
 
It is unsurprising, under these circumstances that Indian firms are now increasingly 
concerned with pinning down the sources of quality differences vis-a-vis imported machines.  
Improvements in accuracy and reliability are in part a matter of devoting more resources to 
                                                                                                                                                        
They also include differences in the volume of output. 
16 A sister company, Ace Manufacturing Systems, founded in 1996, makes vertical machining centres. 
17 On the other hand, the relative strengths of the Indian machines, apart from price, lay exclusively in the sales 
and service area (speed of response to service calls, etc), an area in which a domestic producer tends to have a 
comparative advantage. 
18 Reliability can be measured quantitatively as the fraction of operating time lost to breakdowns.  The striking 
fact to emerge here was that the majority of the machine-pairs showed no significant differences, but the Indian 
machines showed a long tail of poor performers. 
 26
machine design; equally, however, they depend upon increasing attention to detail in the 
manufacturing process19. 
 
The ‘Moving Window’: Investing in Capability 
 
The quest for quality improvement is made substantially more difficult by the moving 
window problem.  During the 1970s and 80s, most CNC lathes were of a basic type (single 
spindle, 2-axis machines20).  These basic machines still constitute over 95% of all CNC lathes 
sold in India.  In the US, Japan and Europe, however, users of machine tools have been 
moving in increasing numbers over the past decade, to more sophisticated (multi-spindle, 
multi-axis) machines.   These more sophisticated machines are cost-effective for user firms 
only if they face sufficiently high wage costs; in the Indian market, almost all users find it 
uneconomical to use such machines. 
 
This situation creases an invidious trap for Indian firms: since wage rates are low, user 
companies demand first generation technology.  But if the general level of industrial 
development advances, leading to higher relative wages, some part of demand will shift 
towards second generation machines.  The only way the Indian producers can avoid being 
trapped in a last generation technology is to invest ahead of demand. 
 
This involves the outlay of substantial fixed costs in machine design, in the knowledge that 
the volume of sales of the machine over its lifetime will never justify the outlay;  the return 
                                                 
19 Finally they depend upon achieving a substantial volume of output, since the training of machinists in the 
production of any machine type to achieve uniformly high standards over successive machines is much easier it 
the plant has a continuous flow of machines through the shop. 
20 Multiple spindles allow simultaneous machining of different surfaces on the machined component.  Multi-axis 
machines allow more degrees of freedom in the orientation of the spindle(s), allowing a complex part to be 
machined in a single setting - avoiding the need to release and reset the part for successive operations. 
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lies in the development of capability, on which the indirect, long term returns may be 
substantial21.  At least one Indian firm is currently developing its next generation of machines 
on this basis. 
 
                                                 
21 This problem is not peculiar to Indian firms; one Taiwanese firm has recently entered into a joint venture with 
a Japanese partner, while expecting to make no net profit on the venture.  The payoff comes purely from 
developing capability in the design and production of leading edge machines. 
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6.  Perspectives and Implications 
 
The analytical framework which I have been sketching in this lecture suggests a number of 
new perspectives on some long-standing issues in the economics of industrial development.  
In closing, I would like to comment briefly on four key ideas. 
 
The Limits to Convergence 
 
Over the past decade, a substantial macroeconomic literature has tackled the question of 
convergence: have the differences in real income per capita across countries widened or 
narrowed over the past few decades?  The picture that emerges from this literature is captured 
in the phrase convergence clubs.  Differences among a group of high income countries 
have narrowed, as real incomes in Europe and Japan have moved towards American levels.  
Meanwhile, a large group of low-income countries have become relatively poorer.  Against 
this background, there have been some striking promotions, as a handful of countries, 
mostly in East Asia, have moved upwards to join the high income club (Quah (1996)). 
 
The question raised by these empirical findings is: to what extent can we extrapolate the 
underlying trends?  To what kind of configuration are we moving? 
 
One implication of the present analysis is that, as more countries join the high income club, 
the difficulties facing future promotees become greater.  The central theme of the market 
structure literature is that the convergence of a larger number of firms to similar levels of 
capability will increase the incentives for some subgroup of these firms to similar levels of 
capability will increase the incentives for some subgroup of these firms to accelerate their 
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efforts to draw ahead of the pack.  The implication of this for the convergence process is 
that, the closer we come to convergence, the harder it is to advance further:  there are 
fundamental mechanisms that would constrain the process of convergence, even if all 
intrinsic differences between countries (in terms of climate, natural resources, etc.) were 
eliminated. 
 
Shifting Trajectories 
 
Some of the most dramatic changes in market structure, and in industry leadership, occur 
when the technological trajectory followed by an industry shifts. devaluing old capabilities 
and creating an equal opportunities framework for some group of potential entrants.  The 
advent of the transistor effectively wiped out the group of businesses that manufactured 
electrical valves; the transistor was a superior replacement for the valve in almost all 
applications, but expertise in valve design and manufacture conferred no advantage to these 
incumbents relative to new companies that quickly developed expertise in silicon-based 
technology.  The same kind of shift has happened at the level of national markets: the rise of 
Germany as an industrial power in the late nineteenth century was underpinned by its 
advances in the new science-based chemical industries, and in the newly developing 
electrical sector.  Are there lessons here for the process of industrial development22,23? 
                                                 
22 Any attempt to address this issue brings us to the question of whether there are some natural hierarchies of 
capabilities.  Those countries that migrated upwards to join the high-wage club over the past 50 years have 
tended to follow a sequence that begins at point A of the triangle diagram of Figure 4, and then moves upwards.  
Thus Japan excelled in textiles in the 1950s, in machine tools in the 1960s, and in consumer electronics in the 
1970s.  The several East Asian economies that rose to prominence in the 1980s followed similar paths.  The idea 
of such a hierarchy of capabilities makes good sense, for two reasons:  first, as each firm develops its 
capabilities, the natural turnover of labour generates externalities for all firms who recruit staff in the same 
industry, and in cognate industries, insofar as all skills are in part transferrable.  Secondly, firms operating at any 
level in our putative hierarchy will draw some of their input from firms with lower level capabilities: thus the 
development of a machine-tool industry is facilitated by the presence of a network of basic engineering shops 
capable of producing castings, sheet-metal work, and basic machine components at low cost. 
23 One idea that has been widely canvassed in recent years is that the information technology sector is 
different, in that it relies to a negligible degree on inputs other than well-educated software designers.  IT is 
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The ‘accumulation of capital’ revisited ... 
 
The view I have elaborated above stands in sharp contrast to the view that the process of 
growth and development is driven by the flow of savings, via capital investment, so that real 
wages rise as a result of an ever-increasing capital-labour ratio; given more capital per head, 
the marginal product of labour, and so the real wage, is correspondingly greater. (- a view 
widely canvassed as an explanation of the rapid growth in East Asian economies.) 
 
On the view I have set out above, things work almost exactly in reverse: the primary driver of 
growth is the gradual build-up in firms capabilities, which raises the economy-wide real 
wage.  Capital accumulation now appears as a complementary effect:  the higher real wage 
makes it profitable for each firm to shift to more capital-intensive techniques.  As the firm 
makes that shift, the rise in its capital-labour ratio further raises the marginal revenue product 
of labour at the firm level; and so underpins the rising real wage level. 
 
The idea emerges clearly on looking at India's machine-tool producers.  These firms operate 
with a much lower capital-labour ratio than their Japanese or Taiwanese competitors24.  Yet 
their different capital-labour ratios are an optimal response to current Indian wage rates;  a 
rise in capital investment would indeed raise productivity, but not by a sufficient amount to 
generate a normal rate of return on the capital employed.  On the other hand, an economy-
wide advance in the levels of firms capabilities will imply a rise in real wages;  not until 
                                                                                                                                                        
also different in another key respect, in that it can - to some degree - operate with teams who may be dispersed 
across different geographical areas, thus avoiding the (im-)mobility problem addressed in Section 3 above. 
24 Differences in the capital-labour ratio are primarily effected by changing the mix of conventional  (non-
CNC) machines as against (CNC) turning centres and machining centres, in the production of components.  It 
also involves, at the extreme, a move to a highly automated production process, in which much of the machining 
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such a shift begins to occur will the machine-tool makers find it attractive to make substantial 
changes in their capital-labour ratios. 
 
The ‘wealth of nations’ question 
 
On my present interpretation, the proximate cause of differences in the wealth of nations 
lies in the capabilities of firms25.  It does not lie in capital per head, which - in the modern 
world of (near) perfect capital mobility - is simply an endogenous variable that responds to 
shifts in relative levels of capability:  capital flows towards capable firms, and towards the 
countries that have more capable firms.  The enhanced capital stock enables these firms to 
further increase their levels of labour productivity, laying the basis for further advances in 
capability. 
 
But if this is the proximate cause, then what is the ultimate cause?  What factors encourage 
the entry of firms, and the development of capabilities?  Here, the institutional and legal 
background within which firms operate is the key.  A central theme in recent literature has 
                                                                                                                                                        
and assembly process is carried out on a fully automated production line that can be run with minimal 
supervision. 
25 The process of industrial development, of course, requires a large number of conditions to be present, all of 
which must be satisfied.  To speak of any one element being the proximate cause may seem inappropriate, but 
what I have in mind here is the idea that, in certain kinds of country at certain times, one of the necessary 
conditions becomes a binding constraint.  My claim is therefore limited to the context of those "middle group"  
countries such as India in which the pre-conditions for the development of an industrial base are already 
satisfied and in which we may, to some approximation, regard capital markets are being well functioning.  This 
argument does not apply, for example, to the eighteenth century environment in which Adam Smith first posed 
his question:  there, the institutional and legal environment that facilitated the formation of the limited liability 
company lay in the future; mobilizing capital via the stock market was much more difficult; and the system of 
property rights pertaining to invention and innovation was primitive in the extreme.  In that setting, the 
assembling of financial (working) capital to underpin a firm's operations was a binding constraint.  Meanwhile, 
production techniques were advancing less rapidly, and achieving a relatively high level of capability was 
arguably less difficult. 
Similar conditions apply to many less developed countries today: as de Soto (2000) has argued, the absence of 
secure property rights in land, and real estate, is a serious barrier to the mobilizing of financial capital to 
underpin the growth rate of the corporate sector. 
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concerned the key role of these factors26, and a consideration of these (more basic) factors 
lies beyond my present scope.  What I would, however, like to remark upon is the way in 
which these - and related - factors fall within the analytical framework I have set out above.  
One of the most striking factors that handicap firms in developing economies lies in the 
additional costs which they incur as a result of excessive and inappropriate regulatory 
controls, and in the petty corruption that develops around their compliance - or non-
compliance - with such restrictions.  Further examples of such cost-increasing features of the 
setting in which firms operate abound: inefficient public power supplies, for instance, will 
force firms to operate high-cost in-house backup plants to cover periods of power blackouts.  
A catalogue of such factors would be a lengthy one; but from an analytical viewpoint they 
can be rolled into a single concept:  the cost of doing business in the country - which could 
be expressed, say, as the (typical) percentage increase in the unit cost of production 
associated with such local disadvantages.  Attempts to quantify various elements of these 
costs are still in their infancy, but few measurement exercises in economics could be more 
worthy of attention: for it is here that we can move from benchmarking firms, towards 
benchmarking the effectiveness of governments in providing an environment in which the 
growth of capabilities will be facilitated. 
                                                 
26 On the importance of personal property rights, see for example, Pipes (1999).  On the property rights of firms, 
and their role in underpinning the flow of capital to firms, see North (1989,1990).  
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